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de•novo
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE EVIL TECHNOLOGY HYPOTHESIS:
A DEEP ECOLOGICAL READING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
UGO MATTEI, LUIGI RUSSI

ABSTRACT
This short paper advances the hypothesis that international law, far from
being a purely neutral “indeterminate” technology that can lend itself to both
good and bad uses, might actually be structurally biased to produce
exploitative outcomes. This hypothesis is presented through several steps.
The first part presents Martti Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy thesis, followed
by Anthony Anghie’s depiction of international law as a technology. The
possibility of an inherent bias of technology, such that it will lend itself to
exploitative uses, even with the best of intentions, is then introduced in
Section III, using the writing of radical ecological thinkers Ran Prieur and
Derrick Jensen. This theory is then discussed specifically in relation to
international law in Section IV.
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INTRODUCTION

This paper advances a quite provocative thesis that locates itself in a line of
analysis aimed at the radical critique of some of the fundamental
assumptions of the modern conception of the rule of law. Such critique is a
genuine pars destruens in the path to build a radically new conception of the
law, based on equality1 and ecology, rather than on efficiency and property
accumulation. Today a strong courageous pars destruens is greatly needed
because, as Western Lawyers, we are living in an “age of self
congratulation,”2 and thus participating in a worshipping of growth and
development through technological progress. Such attitude, particularly
diffused in the dominant Anglo-American professional legal setting, should
be immediately abandoned for the sake of global survival. The age of selfcongratulation easily turns into an age of cynicism (in the sense of Lacan and
Žižek), which delegitimizes the politically transformative role of legal
scholarship and makes it impotent.
The self-congratulatory attitude (which of course must be exposed as
classist and racist) may be hidden even in the apparently more radical
paradigms of legal research.3 Indeed the fundamental idea of this paper
emerged in the context of a conference entitled “Towards a Radical
International Law” held at the London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE) during May 2011, which placed itself squarely at the heart of
such more radical paradigms.
For the conception of this paper, the venue was particularly important, as
the conference was held within the architectural structure of the New
Academic Building (NAB) at LSE. The NAB is a majestic seven-somethingstory building that radiates newness and modernity. The perfect building,
one would say, to embody the ethos of excellence of the contemporary
university. And yet, natural light was distinctively lacking. Small, encased
windows and a see-through ceiling were not nearly enough to provide
sufficient illumination, requiring the backup of copious artificial lighting.
Additionally, stairs were apparently available only up to the first two floors,
leaving elevators as the preferred means of transport to reach any higher
floors. What kind of person might the architects who designed the building
have had in mind as they set out to draw the plans? Clearly, the person must
have been someone oblivious to the difference between natural and artificial
light. Additionally, that person must also have been someone who values the
minimization of “body usage” to reach the classroom, bodies being simply
brain vessels.
So, technology (lights and elevators) in the building crucially made it
possible for people to hold or develop an ethos of separateness from nature,
as well as one’s body. And not even to question its awkwardness: all of the
conference participants were, in fact, bathing in artificial light and taking
those elevators, without even noticing the kind of detachment from their
bodies and the world around them that the infrastructure was silently
promoting. Maybe, then, this is what international law also does, once we
See UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 202–16 (2008).
Id. at 5-6, 19-20.
3 See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
1
2
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look at it as a technology. In the sections to follow, we will try to set out the
hypothesis that international law might be its own greatest problem,
promoting a silent ethos of exploitation of the “other” by reducing empathy
and facilitating extraction: this we call the “evil technology hypothesis.” The
benefit of looking at international law in this way lies in the whole new
horizon of questions it opens up, specifically about the scales of our
economic system, of our civilization, and of our fundamental dependency on
a model of extraction.4 Just as it would be impossible to inhabit the new LSE
building without tremendous consumption of energy, it would be impossible
to conceive of international law outside of a human organization based on
plunder.
This being the plan, Section II will provide some limited background on
the current “radical” debate on international law, focusing in particular on
Martti Koskenniemi’s “indeterminacy thesis” and Anthony Anghie’s
depiction of international law as a technology. The tone of Section III marks
an abrupt shift from the previous section, as it explores radical ecological
literature in order to provide a general illustration of the idea that
technology might contribute to an inherently “evil” and detached order in
which the environment and those around us are objectified and made easier
to exploit. Section IV finally discusses the application of the “evil technology
hypothesis” to the realm of international law specifically and looks at what
new horizons of questions this hypothesis may then open up.
II.

INDETERMINACY AND LAW AS TECHNOLOGY

A. Koskenniemi’s Indeterminacy Thesis
Summarizing the arguments of other scholars in one’s own work is always
a daunting task, as there is always the risk of over-simplifying, taking out of
context, or simply misrepresenting views that are made in a certain
argumentative flow which cannot be reproduced in its entirety. With that
caveat in mind, this section endeavors to summarize Koskenniemi’s
argument about the “indeterminacy” of international law, which he famously
articulated in the book From Apology to Utopia.5
Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy thesis is, first of all, not simply the
observation that language is so open-ended that anything may mean both
everything and nothing.6 Instead, Koskenniemi observes that the uncertainty
of the political project behind international law has molded international
law into a soft framework in which competing political positions are able to
find their way through in legal argumentation.7 Koskenniemi puts this very
clearly in the following passage, which is worth quoting in its entirety:

A model of extraction can be understood as an economic paradigm where order and prosperity at
the center are supported through systematic appropriation of resources from the periphery. See
ROBERT BIEL, THE ENTROPY OF CAPITALISM 304 (2012). This argument, whereby capitalism thrives on
the conquest of an environment that is incompatibile with itself, is at the heart of sustainabilitycentered critiques of the neo-liberal economic model, which highlight how expansion through
commodification of “virgin spaces” cannot go on forever.
5 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT,
REISSUE WITH A NEW EPILOGUE (2005).
6 Id. at 595.
7 See Jason Beckett, Rebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical Legal Project, 7
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1045, 105–159 (2006).
4
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[E]ven where there is no semantic ambivalence whatsoever,
international law remains indeterminate because it is based
on contradictory premises and seeks to regulate a future in
regard to which even single actors’ preferences remain
unsettled. To say this is not to say much more than that
international law emerges from a political process whose
participants have contradictory priorities and rarely know
with clarity how such priorities should be turned into
directives to deal with an uncertain future. Hence they agree
to supplement rules with exceptions, have recourse to
broadly defined standards and apply rules in the context of
other rules and larger principles. Even where there is little or
no semantic ambiguity about an expression in a rule—say,
about “armed attack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter—that
expression cannot quite have the normative force we would
like it to have. It cannot because it is also threatening—what
about an imminent attack? The same reason that justifies the
rule about self-defence also justifies setting aside its wording
if this is needed by the very rationale of the rule—the need to
protect the State. And because no rule is more important than
the reason for which it is enacted, even the most unambiguous
rule is infected by the disagreements that concern how that
reason should be understood and how it ranks with competing
ones: what is it, in fact, that is necessary to “protect the State”
and how does that reason link with competing ones such as
those of “peaceful settlement”? It follows that it is possible to
defend any course of action—including deviation from a clear
rule—by professionally impeccable legal arguments that look
from rules to their underlying reasons, make choices between
several rules as well as rules and exceptions, and interpret
rules in the context of evaluative standards.8
Koskenniemi’s position, however, is further complicated by the fact that he
does not impute a naïf neutrality to international legal discourse. He
recognizes, instead, the presence of a structural bias that systematically
favors certain outcomes.9 As Susan Marks puts it: “things can be, and quite
frequently are, contingent without being random, accidental, or arbitrary.”10
For Koskenniemi, however, structural bias does not seem to be grounded in
the medium of international law itself, but rather, in the presence of “a
professional consensus or a mainstream answer to any particular
problem”11 which, precisely because of international law’s indeterminacy,
are able to direct it to their ends. This Koskenniemi seems to state quite
clearly in the following passage:
[N]othing of our ability to challenge the bias is grounded in
the law itself. The choice will be just that—a “choice” that is
“grounded” in nothing grander than a history of how we
came to have the preferences that we have and what we
know of the world and our relationship to it. “Theory” may be
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5, at 590–91 (emphasis added).
Id. at 607.
10 Susan Marks, False Contingency, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1, 2 (2009).
11 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5, at 607.
8
9
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needed to create awareness of the origin and consequences
of our choices—perhaps a theory of “justice” or of economic
efficiency—but those theories do not fully justify our choices.
A “gap” will remain between all such languages and what it is
that we choose, whether the bias, or its contrary. The
existence of this “gap” is not insignificant for professional
practice. If the practice is not determined by an anterior
structure or vocabulary, then it cannot be reduced to an
automatic production of such a structure or vocabulary
either. The decision is made, and its consequences are thus
attributable not to some impersonal logic or structure but to
ourselves.12
To restate the point, Koskenniemi appears to articulate a political
“malleability” of international legal discourse, which is smuggled in at the
rupture between international law’s formality and the fluidity of political
reason. This means that international law is not, in and of itself, the problem.
Rather, the problem is the inability of international lawyers to reclaim what
is theirs, namely the ability to engage with the political side of international
law. While international law is in practice “steered” by an invisible
consensus hidden under the cloak of professionalism, by removing that
cloak, international law could become something different thanks to a
renewed political awareness and thereby serve different ends from those it
currently privileges.

B. Anghie and Law as Technology
Anthony Anghie comes from a different starting point. Namely, he sees the
very development of international law as inextricably tied to imperialist
practices. For Anghie, in particular, a crucial role is played by the idea of
“sovereignty,” which:
[E]xpels the non-European world from its realm, and then
proceeds to legitimise the imperialism that resulted in the
incorporation of the non-European world into the system of
international law. The process of transforming the nonEuropean world is completed through decolonisation, which
enables the non-European state to emerge as a sovereign and
equal member of the global community.13
However, despite recognizing that “[t]his exclusion, and the imperialism
which it furthers, constitute in part the primordial and essential identity of
international law,”14 Anghie still appears sympathetic to the idea that
international law could be changed from within to serve “nobler” ends,15
thereby ending closer to Koskenniemi than his starting point may suggest.
For the purpose of this piece, however, Anghie’s work is particularly
interesting for it crucially likens international law to a technology:
The nineteenth century was the age of science, during which
industry was applied for the betterment and progress of
Id. at 615.
Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 THIRD
WORLD Q. 739, 741 (2006) [hereinafter Anghie, Evolution].
14 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (2004).
15 See id. at 318.
12
13
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human society. We see here the suggestion that international
law is not merely a science but a technology. As a technology,
it could help realize the Victorian ideals of progress,
optimism, and liberalism, which, when applied specifically to
the non-European world, meant the civilizing of the
benighted native peoples.16
The definition of technology that Anghie seems to presuppose here is that of
a means to facilitate ends the positive value of which is assumed.17 So, for
instance, in Anghie’s reconstruction of the colonial formation of
international law, the latter is presented as a tool that was adopted to
pursue the “obviously” good objective of civilizing non-Western peoples
through trade.18 What the law-as-technology language hid, of course, was the
fact that the obvious goodness of the civilizing mission was not so obvious
after all, and actually based on a value-laden differential construction of the
“other.”19 This shows that, in Anghie’s and Koskenniemi’s perspective, the
problem with law’s technological character appears simply to be that it
directs the focus away from the political agenda. It follows that, by reawakening its political soul, international law could still be used to promote
more “worthwhile” ends (according to the international lawyer’s own valuejudgments). The end, therefore, justifies the means (i.e., using international
law to deliver a desired outcome).
The argument we seek to make in the next two sections, however, goes
one step further than this. We assume as a starting point that the
international legal project incrementally turned into the global framework of
imperial law20 by excluding global resource redistributions other than those
maintaining the bottom line. As an incrementally expanding “reactive”
institutional setting, international law has seized the historical opportunity
produced by the demise of the Soviet model21 to develop a strong global
alliance with corporate power. This alliance has transformed international
law into a disorder-spreading technology,22 thus producing a global
institutional scenario that progressively transfers common resources in
corporate control by legitimizing plunder.23 We more clearly contend here
that such global transformation does not even require conscious political
agency at this point. Indeed, the very interposition of a technology in the
pursuit of a particular interest increases the distance between oneself and
the “other,” and this invariably works to enable the expansion of
Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
International Law, 40 HARV. J. INT’L. L. 1, 64 (1999) [hereinafter Anghie, Peripheries].
17 A very similar argument is made by Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader. See supra note 1, at 5, 75
(2008).
18 Anghie, Peripheries, supra note 16, at 57.
19 According to Anthony Anghie, this process involves the creation of “a gap between two cultures,
demarcating one as ‘universal’ and civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and uncivilized.” Anghie,
supra note 14, at 4. A gap which is then exploited to “normalize” the “inferior” culture through a
range of techniques. Id. A contemporary example of this “dynamic of difference” is presented by
Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader, in their monograph discussing the use of the “rule of law” precisely as
a tool to demarcate the “developed” from the “underdeveloped,” and subsequently to intervene
upon the latter in exploitative ways. See MATTEI & NADER, supra note 1, at 71 ff.
20 See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003).
21 See Boris N. Mamyluk & U. Mattei, Comparative International Law, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385
(2011).
22 See Kees Keizer, Siegwart Lindberg & Linda Steg, The Spreading of Disorder, Vol. 322- No. 5908
SCIENCE 1681–85 (2008).
23 See MATTEI & NADER, supra note 1.
16
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unsustainable and exploitative relationships to the human and other-thanhuman inhabitants of the planet, even under the best of intentions. This, in
other words, is the “evil technology hypothesis.”
III.

THE EVIL TECHNOLOGY HYPOTHESIS

This section introduces the “evil technology hypothesis” in relation to
technology in general, with a view to applying it to international law in
Section IV. The hypothesis is based on two premises. The first one is that
technology, by facilitating activity on the part of an “actor” on an “acted on,”
increases the rift between them so that the former finds it easier to
experience the latter as an object other than him or herself. This allows “use”
of that object and breeds in the “actor” the impression that the “acted on”
only exists to be acted upon by the “actor.” The second premise is taken from
the work of ecological philosopher Derrick Jensen, namely that civilization,
understood as the growth of communities larger than the landbase they are
dwelling on is able to support, is inherently unsustainable and needs an
increasing reliance on trade. Trade which must be kept going at all costs
(lest starving the centers of much-needed resources for their continuing
existence), even through violence if necessary.
Turning to the first premise, the dis-empathizing potential inherent in the
use of technology—of any technology—is illustrated by radical ecologist Ran
Prieur in his zine Civilization Will Eat Itself through a hypothetical example.24
Prieur suggests to imagine a group of super-intelligent monkeys that learn to
use spears. Spears make it easier for monkeys to kill, as opposed to using
their bare hands:
So spear-using monkeys would kill in more ordinary
circumstances, and more often. They would learn that spearkilling could get them better land, and better food, and better
mates.
They would get used to pleasures they could get only through
spear-killing. Worse, they would lose the skills they needed
to live without spears. Now, to give up their habit of making
and using spears would be so painful that it would be
impossible if you had the self-discipline of a monkey.
Now, if you have the awareness of a monkey, you will
experience your spear-killing societal pattern as an
uncompromisable necessity, and you will viciously attack
anything that threatens it. But what threatens it is the
expansion of your own empathy. If you—or other monkeys—
start feeling as close to a monkey at the end of a 30-foot
spear throw as you used to feel to a monkey right in front of
you, if it starts to get as hard for monkeys to kill with spears
as it used to be to kill with bare hands, then you fear that the
spear-killing
technology
will
become
emotionally
unsustainable, and your civilization will collapse, and you

RAN PRIEUR, CIVILIZATION WILL EAT ITSELF (A4-formatted ed. 2001), available at
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/pdfs/a4/Ran_Prieur__Civilization_Will_Eat_Itself_a4.pdf.
24

270

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W D E • N OV O

2012

will lose your economic advantages, and you and your
friends and family will suffer and maybe die.
So you viciously attack the expansion of your own empathy,
and the empathy of others. Monkeys learn and teach others
to stick a boundary between “self” and “other”, to sustain fear
and hatred indefinitely, to greet the unfamiliar with mistrust
and discomfort and hostility, not curiosity and excitement
and acceptance. And here, I say, is where the monkeys
become what we call evil: when dependence on a harmful
behavior leads them to inhibit their love.25
While in Prieur’s example the focus is solely on the empathy between
“monkeys,” it is submitted that the example could well be extended—at least
from the perspective of “deep ecology”—beyond the feeling of empathy
between beings of the same species. Deep ecology is the “branch” of ecology
that focuses not just on “conservation” for anthropocentric survival
concerns, but on re-defining the basic paradigm of the relation between
humans and nature.26 It posits an underlying kinship between human and
other-than-human beings, which has been explained, for instance, through a
panpsychist understanding of the world that regards consciousness as a
property inherent in all matter. In this framework, human consciousness
simply becomes a property emerging out of the complex interaction of
consciousness already present in matter.27 Adopting such a perspective, it
becomes possible to argue that a basic empathy between human and otherthan-human beings is at the root of life on the planet, so that something
meaningful is also lost whenever the other-than-human world is objectified
and made subservient to human needs.
Returning to the “evil technology hypothesis,” once technology enables “a
disconnection and contraction of consciousness, a forced channeling of
wider energies to serve narrower interests,”28 a growth mechanism is set in
motion whereby those narrower interests (such as the reproduction of a
particular community), after being “privileged” through technology, finds
room to expand and take a life of their own:
You start doing it because it gives your pinched-off
perspective (your side, your cause, your “self,” your status,
your money) some advantage, and then you get yourself
drawn into doing it more and bigger, and you forget how to
get along without it, and you use it to build and maintain
ways of being that you don’t know how to build and maintain
without it.29
Additionally, technology also leads to more technology to keep sustaining a
technological civilization, since “[t]he pattern repeats itself with more and
more new habits enshrined and imprisoned in new physical artifacts.”30 For
our purposes, it is relevant to observe that the growth dynamics of narrow
RAN PRIEUR, CIVILIZATION WILL EAT ITSELF 27–28 (A4-formatted ed. 2001), available at
http://theanarchistlibrary.org/pdfs/a4/Ran_Prieur__Civilization_Will_Eat_Itself_a4.pdf.
26 See JANE HOLDER & MARIA LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, LAW & POLICY 48-50 (2d ed. 2007).
27 STEPHAN HARDING, ANIMATE EARTH: SCIENCE, GAIA AND INTUITION 93–94 (2nd ed. 2009).
28 PRIEUR, supra note 25, at 10.
29 Id. at 10–11.
30 Id. at 29.
25
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interests served by technology equally appears to be at the heart of what
Jensen sees as the unsustainable character of civilization, which he defines
as:
[A] culture . . . that both leads to and emerges from the
growth of cities . . . with cities being defined—so as to
distinguish them from camps, villages, and so on—as people
living more or less permanently in one place in densities high
enough to require the routine importation of food and other
necessities of life.31
The dependence on trade generates a compulsion to secure the inflow of
resources into the center, however that center may be defined (city, region,
state, coalition). A compulsion which, if initially sustained through overtly
violent means, is later sustained through “an appearance of beneficence and
helpfulness, sufficient to awaken some degree of affection and trust and
loyalty.”32
Here, then, is the essence of the “evil technology hypothesis”: technology
enables specialized care of certain narrow interests, which are consequently
abstracted from the environment they originate from—and are
symbiotically embedded in—to begin with. This separation facilitates the
subordination of the same environment to such narrower interests, igniting
positive feedback loops that reinforce their expansion.33 In relation to
human communities, in particular, the use of technologies can be seen as the
spark that, by positing “man” in antithesis to the “environment,” sets off the
exploitation of the latter by the former, igniting the growth of unsustainable
human communities that are out of sync with the landbase they dwell on and
require secure inflows of energy to sustain themselves. Most importantly, as
a community takes the path of technology, it grows increasingly
unaccustomed to living without technology, looking down to nontechnological ways of living as being somewhat backwards, and re-defining
its own standard of living as the “correct” one.34
To contextualize this in relation to the above discussed architecture of the
NAB at LSE, the use of the elevator—regardless of whether I am using it
because I am tired or just lazy—still pries me further apart from my body, to
the point that by always taking the elevator I become increasingly unable to
even experience tiredness, as I pass up opportunities to establish a
connection with my body in climbing a flight of stairs. Additionally, using the
elevator makes me look down on older buildings that do not have one, as it
engenders an expectation that buildings should have one. Technology
induces needs, false wants that only technology itself is later able to fulfill.
Massive advertising of last generation smart phones in African rural settings
shows in practice the impact of technology on deeply rooted behavior
DERRICK JENSEN, ENDGAME, VOL. 1: THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIZATION 17 (2006).
Id. at 105, quoting LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS
PROSPECTS 36 (1961).
33 It is worthwhile to observe the similarity of this description to the ‘autopoiesis’ of specialized
social systems in Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, and to the related growth imperative
described in Gunther Teubner, Two Readings of Global Law, Paper Presented at the “Law of the
Commons” Seminar, Turin (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://uninomade.org/two-readings-ofglobal-law/ [hereinafter Teubner, Two Readings]. See also FRITJOF CAPRA, THE HIDDEN CONNECTIONS
70 ff. (2002).
34 PRIEUR, supra note 25, at 30–31. This is translated in legal terms with the idea of “lack,” as
described in MATTEI & NADER, supra note 1, at 7, 67–76.
31
32
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transformed by such new necessities.35 Even in remote villages today people
“call” before visiting friends and relatives. This of course produces
separation, individualization of spaces, and consequent disruption of
feelings of community.36
There are two further points to be made. First of all, as having elevators
(or smart phones) becomes constitutive of the idea of a “good society,” this
justifies the extraction of resources to uphold a lifestyle in which elevators
(and smart phones) are present. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, as
I come to see elevators and smart phones as an increasingly coessential
aspect of a “good life,” a whole bundle of connected ideas is silently
smuggled in my worldview (such that one should not get tired, or feel tired,
or that taking the stairs is somewhat of a nuisance, even though it affords a
greater opportunity for me actually to be with my body and be attuned to
what it has to tell me). Such ideas, which I might not wish to hold upon
careful reflection, are mirror images of the same subject-object dichotomy
that is one of the fruits of technology (e.g., elevators being a technology to
move “weight”—that’s how reductively my body comes in the picture—
across vertical space). In the domain of the law, based as it is on notions of
rights, privacy, and discrete spaces, the diffusion of technology usually
produces more individualization and consequent decline of care for the
public (or relational) spaces. Spaces and practices left behind by
technological evolution fall abandoned. For instance “giving a call” will likely
substitute a visit in village contexts just as American colleagues today
exchange e-mails across the corridors of academic departments, thus
abandoning real visits and knocking on the door. Usually stairs, assumed to
be scarcely used, are left dirty and undecorated even in five-star hotels. The
diffusion of cell phones has produced the virtual disappearance of public
telephones (now extremely difficult to locate), and internet cafes (which are
relatively socializing spaces) are likely to be put out of business by the
diffusion of smart phones. The private and the public very rarely can live
together since the latter is always colonized by the former.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN EVIL TECHNOLOGY?

A. The Social Engineering Posture
There are several ways in which the “evil technology hypothesis” may be
applied to international law. First of all, international law can be seen as yet
another technology needed to sustain an increasingly exploitative and
unsustainable lifestyle gone rogue at the global level. As said by a participant
at the aforementioned LSE conference, the function of international law
might simply be to persuade the winners that they are “in fairness” entitled
to the resources they have taken, as well as to persuade the losers that, after
all, they have lost a “fair” game, and they should not complain. As it has been
said, international law “confers a degree of ethical respectability and moral
acceptability to the selfish resistance by the strong and rich to disgorge, to
See generally Jenny C. Aker and Isaac M. Mbiti, Africa Calling: Can Mobile Phones Make a Miracle?,
BOSTON REVIEW (Mar.-Apr. 2010), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR35.2/aker_mbiti.php.
36 Cf. Thomas A. Kelley III, Cell Phones and Oracles: Legal Globalization Meets the Marabout's
Mystical Justice in the West African Republic of Niger 37, 46 (University of North Carolina Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 05-22, 2005) (illustrating how the bulk of the workload of rural courts in
Niger consists of cell phone thefts).
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the poor and weak, part of their unfair share of global resources
accumulated by plunder.”37 Even if we set out to use it with the greatest
possible benevolence, it still functions as the proverbial stick in Ran Prieur’s
“parable of the monkeys.”38 Namely, it still serves to reduce the room for
empathy between the international lawyer and the human or other-thanhuman beings that will be affected by his or her decisions. International law
is perhaps inextricable from a certain flavor of social engineering,39 in which
human and other-than-human beings are simply those at the receiving end,
whom and which the most well-intentioned international lawyer might
sincerely be willing to help. As if help did not force the receiver into the mold
of being “in need of help” (according to whose worldview?). This is nicely
illustrated in relation to the concept of poverty, as opposed to wealth, by
ecological philosopher Satish Kumar:
For millennia there have been peoples all over the world who
lived in great simplicity without ever considering themselves
“poor,” “underdeveloped” or “uncivilised.” My own family in
Rajasthan lived without the trappings and trivia of what is
considered to be rich and advanced, and yet we never
thought of ourselves as “poor.”40
Mattei and Nader have been attuned to this perverse characteristic of
international law, showing how it is often the case that truly well-meaning
people partake in a game bigger than themselves as they fiddle with
international law. These, Mattei and Nader call the “do-gooders.”41
China Miéville appears to show an equally skeptical stance towards the
role of international law.42 First of all, he observes how the positing of formal
equality between the different actors of international law yields an effect
similar to that which Prieur discusses in relation to technology in general:
namely, formal equality abstracts and isolates a given relationship, enabling
the selective channeling of energy into that relationship without looking
back. In Miéville’s terms, this selective channeling of energy comes in the
form of “unequal violence” within a framework of abstract juridical equality,
whereby “[f]or the state that knows that its interpretation will ‘win,’ that it
has the power to effect authoritative legal interpretation, the spread of
juridical equality is not only no block to domination: it can be conducive to
it.”43 It is from such premises that Miéville then comes to the conclusion that
“[a] world structured around international law cannot but be one of
imperialist violence.”44 One can predict here that the spread of international
law as a technology will invariably make domestic law decline (just as the
elevators make the stairs decline or cell phones produce the disappearance
of public phones) in importance and meaning, eventually endangering the
sustainable difference in the law45 by universalizing the corporate-friendly
atmosphere of imperial law (something that is already clearly happening).
MATTEI & NADER, supra note 1, at 197.
See supra note 21.
39 ANGHIE, supra note 14, at 154.
40 SATISH KUMAR, YOU ARE THEREFORE I AM: A DECLARATION OF DEPENDENCE 116 (2002).
41 MATTEI & NADER, supra note 17, at 15.
42 See China Miéville, The Commodity-Form Theory of International Law: An Introduction, 17 LEIDEN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 273 (2004).
43 Id. at 297.
44 Id. at 302.
45 See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 318 (2000).
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B. The Question of Scale
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, positing the problem in terms of
the need to “fix” international law might just be the equivalent of someone
thinking about how to bring elevators to buildings that have none, assuming
we need elevators in the first place. Do we need international law? What
questions does international law prevent us from asking, thereby acting as a
smokescreen? In our view, the great loss from a system of international law
is that it leads one to think of the global system of economic relations as
natural and not as a contingency magnified by history and, yes, international
law itself.46 Are we ultimately able to use international law, or are we simply
being used by international law to pursue an impersonal growth dynamic
inherent in the system?47
James Tully provides a good inroad into the issue of the scale of human
activity on the planet, specifically from the perspective of international law.
In a paper illustrating how the development of constitutional democracy is
inseparable from the surrounding imperialist system of international legal
relations,48 he introduces the possibility of de-imperializing constitutional
democracy by a process of retrieval of “indigenous” constitutional forms, the
defining character of which is their ability to “flow” along with the activity of
the people, rather than being superimposed to them.49 The purpose of this
would be to facilitate direct participatory freedom through the creation of
“networks of globalization in which the constitutional form of the network is
based on the ongoing democratic and non-violent exercise of constituent
powers of the partners who subject themselves to it.”50 For the purpose of
this paper, Tully’s idea of “ongoing . . . exercise of constituent powers”51
seems to allude to a dimension in which the differentiation of constitutional
powers (e.g. economic, military, and political power) blurs into an
inextricable totality. The way this relates to the question of scale is by
suggesting that the separation of different realms of human activity52 might
arise primarily in a society that is global in its reach, and requires a
technological “channeling of wider energies to serve narrower interests.”53
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 5, at 614.
Once again, there is a parallelism here with Teubner’s autopoietic theory of law, first presented
in GUNTHER TEUBNER, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (1987), as well as with
his warnings about the dangers inherent in the expansionist impersonal dynamics internal to social
systems, on which see Gunther Teubner, The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by
“Private” Transnational Actors, 69 MODERN LAW REVIEW 327 (2006) and Teubner, Two Readings,
supra note 33.
48 James Tully, The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy, in THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 315–338, (Martin Loughlin &
Neil Walker eds. 2008).
49 See id. at 320.
50 Id. at 337.
51 Id.
52 In the language of social systems theory, we are referring to functional differentiation, for a
definition of which, see infra note 53.
53 PRIEUR, supra note 25, at 10. It is, after all, a feature of functional differentiation—i.e. the
breakdown of global society into highly-specialized realms of social activity such as law, politics
and, indeed, also law—that of being in principle all-inclusive, projecting a demand on people the
world over to partake in these specialised “conversations,” so as to undertake a career within the
specialized social systems. And, yet, as Moeller aptly puts it:
46
47

[M]any have no access whatsoever to careers and are reduced to a bodily
existence without social identity—or with a strictly negative one. Children born
in the favelas of Central America have no careers, not even unsuccessful ones,
to identify themselves with. They often do not have the chance not to graduate
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So, at the cost of reading more into Tully’s ideas than he originally might
have assumed, it could be said that what he really argues for is a detechnologization and de-specialization of social interaction, disclosing a
realm (not of specialization) but of “vital connections—connections more
like the fiber of what we call nature where there aren’t barriers between the
relationships of things to each other . . . [where] everything branches into
everything,”54 a realm where religion, politics, or economics fade out in the
blur of “human beings behaving in certain ways.”55 A similar argument
appears to also be made by Mattei and Nader, as they advocate the
leveraging of local laws, understood as:
[A] different force not grounded, as is the imperial rule of
law, in the needs of corporate capitalist development masked
as efficiency[:] [p]eople violated in their sense of justice or
threatened in chances of survival (which is often the same
thing) are inventing, through networks and groups, legal and
pre-legal ways of dealing with life-harming problems and
ultimately with issues of resource distribution.56
If, then, one is to take seriously this idea of a space unfettered by
differentiation into separate specialized realms of activity, the discussion
cannot be restricted to law or politics, but it must embrace human lifestyles
in their totality. For international law to fade into oblivion, the scale of
economic activity on the planet and, before that, the logic of domination and
objectification of human and other-than-human beings that is often deeply
entrenched in people’s hearts and minds (whether they know it or not) have
to come under our radar.57 E.F. Schumacher famously advocated a shift in
lifestyle and worldview to accommodate such goals:
[O]ur most important task is to get off our present collision
course. And who is there to tackle such a task? I think every
one of us, whether old or young, powerful or powerless, rich
or poor, influential or uninfluential. To talk about the future
is useful only if it leads to action now. And what can we do
now, while we are still in the position of ‘never having had it
so good’? To say the least—which is already very much—we
must thoroughly understand the problem and begin to see
the possibility of evolving a new life-style, with new methods
of production and new patterns of consumption: a life-style
designed for permanence. To give only three preliminary
or have a low income or to lose an election. Social inclusion through careers
only includes those with access to function systems. (HANS-GEORG MOELLER,
LUHMANN EXPLAINED: FROM SOULS TO SYSTEMS 93 (2006))
Teubner himself recognizes that the critique of the totalizing tendencies of global capital should
actually boil down to a critique of functional differentiation. See Teubner, Two Readings, supra note
33.
54 JENSEN, supra note 31, at 167.
55 Research Centre Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap, Prof. Timothy Fitzgerald — On Religion and
the
Secular,
Part
2,
YOUTUBE
(Jan,
21,
2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=puRsboyTq_I&feature=related.
56 MATTEI & NADER, supra note 17, at 211.
57 This is why, after all, there was a lurking contradiction between the locked up LSE building—and
the ethos of separatedness it promoted at the individual level—and the ethos of universal
connectedness that all conference participants eventually seemed to share in their (perhaps
paradoxical in the light of this paper) commitment to a more just international law.
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examples: in agriculture and horticulture, we can interest
ourselves in the perfection of production methods which are
biologically sound, build up soil fertility, and produce health,
beauty and permanence. Productivity will then look after
itself. In industry, we can interest ourselves in the evolution
of small-scale technology, relatively non-violent technology,
‘technology with a human face’, so that people have a chance
to enjoy themselves while they are working, instead of
working solely for their pay packet and hoping, usually
forlornly, for enjoyment solely during their leisure time. In
industry, again—and, surely, industry is the pace-setter of
modern life—we can interest ourselves in new forms of
partnership between management and men, even forms of
common ownership.58
For the purpose of this paper, the greatest merit in Schumacher’s argument
is its specific focus on scale: it is perhaps stating the obvious that, if men can
manage anything, it is on a small scale. Otherwise, as the scope of human
interaction attains a global dimension, it is a very real possibility—
masterfully described by Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory—that men
come to be prey of their own creation in a revolt-of-the-machines-type of
scenario. Namely, as human communication achieves a certain scale, it starts
branching out into separate realms (e.g., legal, political, or economic) and
develops its own internal dynamics with respect to which human and otherthan-human beings are simply an external variable, but lack direct control
on.59
Looking at international law with the idea of determining the appropriate
scale of economic and social interaction, the question as to whether the evil
technology hypothesis can be a fitting representation of international law or
not might even be beyond the point. In fact, the power of a hypothesis is that
it enables counterfactual reasoning that unlocks new theoretical
possibilities. In light of this, engaging in a serious discussion about the most
appropriate scale of economic activity—and of twinned systems, like law,
that enable the latter’s functioning60—appears to be a meaningful pursuit in
its own right that also deserves membership in the to-do list of a Radical
International Law movement.

V.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to provide a radical ecological reading of
international law by articulating the “evil technology hypothesis.” For this
purpose, Section II has introduced Martti Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy
E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 21–22 (1975).
See MOELLER, supra note 53, at 22–23; NIELS ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, DISCURSIVE ANALYTICAL
STRATEGIES: UNDERSTANDING FOUCAULT, KOSELLECK, LACLAU, LUHMANN 75 (2003).
60 A similar point is made by Sundhya Pahuja, when she articulates the need to reclaim “the
possibility of discussion about whether growth is the correct lens through which to view the social
or political questions which economics seeks to answer” (Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality 372 (Melbourne
Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 520, 2009),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1743269).
58
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thesis, whereby the uncertain political grounds of the liberal project behind
international law have made international law prone to become an
instrument that is able to justify even radically opposing outcomes,
depending on the political motivations a certain international lawyer may
decide to pursue in each particular case. This has been followed by a brief
foray into Anghie’s theory about the colonial genesis of international law
and, most importantly, his depiction of international law as a technology, i.e.,
as a means to pursue ends, around which the value-judgments are assumed
to be uncontroversial. The Section has restated, as the starting point of our
further argument, the idea of international law as incrementally transformed
by corporate interests into imperial law, a reactive institutional setting
which effectively precludes the possibility of distribution in favor of weaker
actors.
Section III has then investigated the possibility that technology in
general—far from being a form that can accommodate different uses—is
actually “evil” in itself, in that it privileges certain modes of relation to the
human and other-than-human world that systematically favors
objectification of the “other” and an ethos of domination over people and the
planet. Secondly, the ability of technology to channel energies into narrow
pursuits has been regarded as one possible factor behind the unsustainable
growth of civilization, understood as a pattern of human living that (based as
it is on elevation of the reproductive interest of a certain human community
above the possibility for other human and other-than-human communities
equally to renew themselves) is incapable of being supported by the
landbase and requires trade and extraction of resources.
These insights, articulated in ecological literature, have then been
translated in the field of international law in Section IV. First of all, it has
been said that—just like any technology—international law promotes a
certain distance between its “actors” and its “acted on,” which promotes a
posture of social engineering that objectifies and often vilifies the “other.” A
substantial convergence has been found, in this respect, with China
Miéville’s position about the non-neutrality of international law, not only in
its uses, but also precisely as a medium. Secondly, it has been observed that
international law, by being what international lawyers by default tend to
turn to, actually prevents the possibility to question the scale of the economy
and the system of international law that supports it. In the end, regardless of
whether one agrees or not with the proposal that international law may
simply be an “evil technology,” the chance should not be passed up to engage
in a serious and open discussion about whether human activity on the planet
should happen on such a grand scale as to even require a system of
international law to be in place.

